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Abstract - Secure group communications present a unique 
environment where there can be multiple clients and hosts are 
trying to communicate securely within the group. As the number of 
clients and hosts increases the complexity of the communication 
security also increases. Group communications are based on a 
dynamic environment where the clients may join or leave the group 
at any moment. Hence it is important to ensure that only permitted 
entities have access to the group and those that have left the group 
or are not part of the group have no access to the group 
communications. This paper explores the delineation of a secure 
communication filter function that is applicable to group 
communications and is based on the latest Integrated Circuits 
Metrics (ICMetrics). The proposed scheme is based on the use of 
hash functions. To test the scalability of the scheme it has been 
implemented using SHA1 and SHA2. 
Keywords – ICMetrics; group secure communications; key 
generation; group key; group security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much research has been done in designing protocols and techniques 
for secure one to one communication. Group communications differ 
from the classic one to one communication at an architectural level and 
hence at the complexity level. This is why group communications can 
be considered as an aggravation of the one to one communication. A 
typical group communications architecture is composed of at least three 
group members and a group controller. Other similar architectures 
include mesh based highly connected clients and also the conventional 
ring topology which is also referred to as conference communication. 
Although many researchers debate over the need for a specialized group 
controller, researchers generally agree that group communications can 
be more complex and insecure. The reason for this is that every group 
member is a potential point of attack for an attacker. Which implies that 
the group is only as strong as the weakest member in the group. Hence 
there will always be need for designing and implementing group 
communication protocols that are robust and reliable [1]. 
An emerging and promising technology in the field of security is 
ICMetrics. This technology attempts to provide an identity to 
computational devices. The technology exploits the fact that every 
device is unique in its internal environment hence unique characteristics 
can be used by hardware or software modules on the device to generate 
a unique identification for individual devices. The unique 
characteristics of a device can include measurable features like serial 
numbers, addresses, data in the program counter, data in the cache and 
many more. These unique features can be used to generate a number 
that is stable yet unique and can be used to provide identification for 
computation devices. 
In this paper a novel filter based security scheme has been proposed 
that fulfils two security requirements, i.e. access control and key 
exchange for secure group communications. The paper proposes the use 
of a secure filter function that uses timestamps and hashing to generate 
a group key that provides access to legitimate group clients only. The 
proposed security filter is resilient against the man-in-the-middle attack. 
This paper begins with an introduction to the ICMetrics technology 
followed by a study of other contributions in the area of group 
communications. An explanation of keying perspective and how they 
effect group communications is then presented. Section V provides a 
detailed description of the proposed secure filter function and how it 
operates. In the end we perform a standalone and comparative 
evaluation of the proposed security scheme using SHA1 and SHA2. 
II. INTEGRATED CIRCUIT METRICS (ICMetrics) 
ICMetrics is a unique solution because it allows a device to 
recognize itself based on its internal hardware and software 
environment. In conventional security systems related data such as keys 
are stored on the devices. This meant that if the key is compromised 
then the security of the system is also compromised [3]. ICMetrics 
advocates the use of unique device attributes for the generation of an 
ICMetric basis number that can then be used to generate security data. 
An advantage of this technique is that a client will never have to store 
the cryptographic keys on its system because they can be extracted 
using the ICMetric basis number. The ICMetric basis number is also 
discarded after use because whenever it is needed it can be regenerated. 
Hence it can be safely said that since security related data is not stored 
on the system it is possible to greatly reduce the chances of having a 
key compromise. Another mechanism which sets ICMetrics apart from 
other security techniques is that it is hardware and software based so 
any physical attempt to extract ICMetric data will render the ICMetric 
module inoperable, hence the system is protected from key leakages. 
The ICMetric number is based on the use of feature sets that are 
specific to a system. Generation of the ICMetric number is a complex 
 
operation because it involves operations that require change analysis, 
mean value deviation analysis and correlations between different 
feature sets. The ICMetric basis number can be generated by using two 
different techniques; both techniques have their positive and negative 
points. The choice of technique depends upon the required size and 
stability of the number. Both techniques require the extraction of 
features and the application of normalization maps to provide basis 
number stability. The first technique called the feature addition-
combination technique allows the addition of individual feature values 
and hence generates a small yet stable basis number. The second 
technique is called the feature concatenation-combination because it 
generates a basis number by using the concatenation operation and 
hence generates a longer yet less stable basis number [3] [20]. 
III. STATE OF THE ART 
Much work has been done to incorporate security in the classical 
one to one communication environment. Researchers often base their 
secure group communication design on extensions of one to one secure 
communications. Most research work has used variants of the basic 
Diffie Hellman key exchange [4] to provide security in groups. Diffie 
Hellman was designed for key exchange between only two entities. To 
use Diffie Hellman successfully in a group environment it had to be 
extended. Therefore many variants of the Diffie Hellman key exchange 
protocol have been suggested that provide security in group 
communications [5][6]. 
Steiner et al have proposed schemes that assist in group key 
generation in dynamic peer groups. Their proposed schemes target both 
initial key generation and auxiliary keying which is needed when a 
client(s) leaves or joins and existing group[7][8]. 
Research [18][19] has also been done to design data structures that 
can connect communication keys with individual clients. As the number 
of clients grows the task of the group controller becomes complicated 
and intensive. A solution to simplifying the task of the group controller 
is to use a tree based data structure that breaks down the entire group 
into small segments of multiple clients. The keys of each client form the 
leaf of the tree hence reducing the search time and also optimizing the 
rekeying operation. 
Hashing algorithms allows the conversion an arbitrary strength to a 
fixed length string. This ability has been used to produce signatures 
relating to a file or a text. Common uses of hashing are for data 
corruption detection, fingerprinting of messages and comparison of 
large data objects [21]. Many hash algorithms have been proposed but 
the most commonly used are the SHA1 and the SHA2. Both algorithms 
are algorithmically very different from each other. The SHA1 algorithm 
produces a hash of 160 bit length while the SHA2 produces an output of 
256 bit length [22]. 
Research has also been done on various applications of ICMetrics. 
One of the prominent is the integration of ICMetrics into an intelligent 
wheel chair formally known as the SYSIASS project [9]. Research has 
also been done on how ICMetrics can be incorporated into specialized 
areas like document archival in cloud computing [10] and also wireless 
sensor networks [17].Concurrent work is also underway that promotes 
the use of ICMetrics in one to one communications[11]. But until now 
no work has been done on the use of ICMetrics for secure group 
communications. 
IV. KEYING PERSPECTIVES 
Keying in group communications is divided into three categories 
namely centralized, distributed and decentralized [12]. The choice of 
category depends on the architecture, resource constraints and most of 
all level of security required. It is impossible to advocate a particular 
category because each has its positive and negative points. We will 
highlight each category briefly below. 
A. Dictative Keying 
In the dictative approach keying responsibilities are given to a 
group leader or a key generation controller. It is not necessary that the 
leader has to be a fixed entity. A client can be given the additional 
responsibility of being a group controller with privileges. The problem 
with the centralized technique is that the controller needs to be 
protected from attacks because if the controller is compromised then the 
group communication is dismantled. Furthermore, a monolithic 
architecture can be more devastating if an attack is successful on the 
group. 
B. Contributive Keying 
In the contributive keying protocols, clients are given the 
responsibility of generating a key from their individual contributions. 
This does not necessarily mean that there is no group controller. There 
are protocols that need a group controller for the distribution of keys 
once the key has been generated. A vast advantage of the distributed 
protocol is that it allows the generation of a contributive key which is 
generated by taking inputs from individual clients in the group. Security 
analysts have discovered that seemingly secure protocols falling in this 
category are more prone to the man-in-the-middle attack. Simple yet 
ingenious mechanisms can be devised to counter the man-in-the-middle 
attack. 
C. Clustered Keying 
In clustered keying protocols the entire group is divided into 
smaller clusters. Each cluster has its own controller and is responsible 
for key generation and distribution. The complexity involved in this 
technique is the selection/ election of the controller. Once fully 
operational, it has been observed that the protocol is more optimized 
because of the low key distribution latency. Considering an aggressors 
viewpoint, clustered keying provides a target rich environment by 
presenting multiple targets that can be attacked. We must also consider 
the fact that brining down a single client or controller results in partial 
success for the aggressor. Hence many potential targets can mean low 
aggression impact on the group. 
V. PROPOSED WORK 
The design of the secure filter is based on the following principles: 
• The protocol is based on the use of ICMetrics. All security 
related data must be generated by using ICMetrics. 
• Perfect Forward Secrecy – once a client leaves a group it must 
not have access to the group and its activities. This implies that it 
should not be able to guess the group keys after its departure 
from the group. 
• Backward Secrecy –If a new client is admitted to a group then it 
should not have access to the previous keys and data of the 
group. 
 
• Collusion freedom – the attacker should not be able to deduce 
the keys even if it manages to capture some of the 
communications of the group. 
• Clients may join and leave a group as they wish. 
• Scalable – the secure group keying should be scalable. 
• The protocol should interoperate with existing technologies and 
techniques. 
A. Sequence of Flow 
The scheme is based on contributive computation from individual 
clients and the group controller. The group controller is responsible for 
collecting data from individual clients, perform computation on the data 
and then transmit the new computations back to the clients for 
generation of the group key. The scheme provides an access key and 
hence filters those entities that may not be part of the group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Sequence of flow. 
B. One Way Hash Function 
Our proposed scheme is fundamentally based on a one way hash 
function [13][14] which possesses the property that if    is a 
hash function then it should not be computationally feasible to compute 
the message  given the value . In our proposed scheme the hash has 
been used twice to increase the diffusion. 
C. Group Access Key Distribution 
In secure group communications, the important most stage is the 
generation and distribution of keying material. Since this protocol is a 
distributed protocol, our aim is to generate a key that can be generated 
using contributions from individual clients. The proposed secure filter 
function	 is primarily based on the secret sharing scheme that gives 
correct results to only legitimate users. In the equation 
	  is the 
group secure key. The positive integer  is a count of the number of 
clients that are present in the group communication. The secure 
function is composed of a hash function  which can be based on 
any hashing technique. The outer hash function takes as input a 
dividing combination composed of timestamp and the ICMetric basis 
number  for client . 
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(1) 
When a group controller receives input from the individual clients it 
will perform the computation as shown in equation 2. 
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VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
To prove the feasibility of an algorithm it is important to implement 
and study the scheme both from a security and computational 
standpoint. The scheme is composed of two hash function. First of all 
the inner most hash is computed on the ICMetric number. This is done 
so that the ICMetric basis number does not have to be transmitted in its 
original form. The second hash is computed by dividing the timestamp 
with the hash of the ICMetric number. The filter function is secure from 
the man-in-the-middle attack because to generate the key the attacker 
must have access to the time stamp. The time stamp is only known by 
the individual clients and is never broadcast. This also implies that the 
group communications are secure from basic impersonation attacks.As 
with any controller based scheme the only concern is that if the group 
controller is successfully attacked then future key generations will be 
hampered. Therefore having a stable and secure group controller is of 
great importance. 
The simulations and evaluations were carried out on a 1.7GHz Intel 
3rd generation CORE i5 system with 6GB RAM. The algorithm was 
programmed in C++ and the results have been analysed using Maple 
13. Our analysis and previous studies [15] have shown that employing 
hash functions is computationally intensive and their use should be 
discouraged in systems with resource constraints. In group 
communications algorithmic complexity is very important, because for 
large size populations computationally intensive operations can prove 
to be counterproductive. We programmed the algorithm by using both 
SHA1 and SHA2. The results have shown that although SHA2 is more 
secure it requires significant computational effort, which make it 
impractical for large sized groups. To counter the extreme time 
Perform hash on ICmetric number 
Perform hash after combining 
ICMetric hash and a time stamp 
Send to group controller 
Compute the secure filter function 
Broadcast to clients 
Compute the Group Secure Key 
(GSK) 
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requirement of SHA2 we considered the use of SHA1 for the same 
group populations.SHA1is a lower effort algorithm but lacks in the 
provision of security because it generates a 160 bit hash which is prone 
to collisions and matching. 
When the algorithm is run using SHA2 the average increase in the 
time as compared to SHA1 is 2021%. This number indicates the 
phenomenal increase in the amount of time taken by the algorithm to 
fully execute. The entire program was executed using SHA2 and the 
projected results can be seen in figure 2. Clearly as the population size 
increases then using the SHA2 is not feasible if time is of great 
importance. 
 
 
Fig. 2.Execution time (ms) using SHA2. 
The same scheme was run by using the SHA1 with an identical 
population size and increment. We conclude that the time consumption 
is more acceptable when using SHA1. The projected graph using SHA1 
is given in figure 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3.Execution time(ms) using SHA1. 
When comparing both techniques it is clear that SHA1 has a perfect 
advantage and outperforms SHA2 when considering time consumption. 
A merged comparative graph is given in figure 4 that shows the great 
increase in the time consumption for the same client population size. 
When comparing both algorithms, the SHA1 (represented by a point) 
has a much lower execution time as compared to the rapid increase 
demonstrated by the SHA2 (represented by cross) algorithm .One 
should not deduce by just considering the time consumption that SHA2 
is incompatible with the secure function. SHA2 should be used with the 
proposed filter function if the population size is small (up to 100 
clients) or if time can be sacrificed for added security. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Running time (ms) using SHA1(point plot) and SHA2(cross plot). 
Huang and Medhi [16] propose a similar key distribution scheme 
for hierarchal mobile adhoc networks. Just like the scheme presented 
here, their scheme is also based on a decentralized key management 
infrastructure. Their scheme utilizes hashing for key generation hence 
the research provides an attractive comparison model. There are some 
points at which their scheme differs such as it utilizes hierarchies and 
trees which makes it more streamlined. Secondly the number of key 
derivation operations is-9:;(  < which shows the algorithmic 
efficiency of the scheme. The researchers have simulated their work 
using both SHA1 and SHA2. In their research they have only provided 
the time for a single run of the hash function. Our single run of the hash 
function takes 0.00094 seconds as compared to their 0.0003 seconds. 
We can conclude that using SHA1 in our scheme with ICMetrics is 
fully justifiable as the benefits of having ICMetrics greatly outweigh 
the drawbacks. Further SHA2 is computationally intensive and should 
only be used for small sized groups. 
CONCLUSION 
Secure group communications need special attention because multi-
client environments are more prone to attacks. Provisioning security for 
multi-client environment is a delicate task because over provisioning 
can result in slowdowns at the group level. To fully test a secure group 
communication protocol it must be tested for large sized group 
populations because smaller sized populations do not effectively reflect 
the time requirements of a security scheme. In this paper a secure filter 
function has been proposed that is man-in-the-middle attack resilient. 
The filter function is based on a contributive secret sharing scheme that 
can be used for the generation and distribution of a group secure key. 
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To make the scheme more secure we have based the design on the latest 
ICMetrics technology. ICMetrics advocates the use of unique system 
attributes to generate a single ICMetrics number that can be used to 
identify a unique system. This ICMetrics number cannot be directly 
transmitted due to security concerns therefore in our scheme we have 
proposed passing the number through a hash function. The proposed 
security scheme is based on time stamping and hashing therefore to test 
its efficiency we have simulated the algorithm for large sized group 
populations using both SHA1 and SHA2. Both programmed hash 
algorithms possess unique attributes and the complexity of the SHA2 is 
reflected in the execution times of our proposed scheme. The results 
show that SHA1 with ICMetrics is fully scalable and can be practically 
used with the experimented maximum size of 200 participants. Whereas 
SHA2 is algorithmically complex and should be used for populations of 
upto 100 group members. To further study the protocol for performance 
we have done a comparative study against a protocol that has similar 
attributes but is not based on the ICMetrics technology. The results are 
insightful as a clear trade off can be made between the choice of 
hashing technique. 
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